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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses to what extent the development of cooperation between Russia 
and the European Union (EU) to respond to the common threat of increasing drug 
trafficking in Central Asia is desirable and feasible.  First,  it  considers  the growing 
overlap between Russian and EU security interests in Central Asia and provides an 
understanding of the  two sides’  mutual perceptions in this strategic region. Even 
though the current mind-set is one of general mistrust, for instance in fields such as 
energy or human rights, both actors now recognise the imperative of regional and 
international  cooperation  to tackle  terrorist  threats and increasing drug flows. 
Second, the relevance of a joint Russia-EU involvement is analysed by considering 
the evolving trends in drug trafficking since the US-led coalition intervened in 
Afghanistan.  The paper  demonstrates the shortcomings and inadequacy of the 
current counter-narcotics policies as well as their responsibility in hampering regional 
cooperation and international efforts. Third, the respective Russian and EU anti-drug 
strategies and instruments are analysed in order to better assess the possibilities of 
developing synergies on the ground instead of  maintaining competing and 
detrimental standalone visions. Although the feasibility of setting up a pragmatic and 
de-politicised  cooperation between the EU and Russia is  challenging  in many 
regards, this paper shows that it is highly desirable as it would contribute to diminish 
strong risks of instability in the region and would address the security concerns of 
both actors. On the basis of the findings, policy recommendations are formulated for 
the EU. Nathan Dufour 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Since the collapse of the USSR, the five Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) that emerged at the crossroad 
between Europe and Asia have faced challenging questions of governance which 
have been further reinforced by the post-9/11 US-led intervention in Afghanistan. As 
explained by Alain Délétroz of the International Crisis Group, the Central Asian states 
face four major security issues, making the region the central nerve of Eurasia:1 First, 
the proximity of the Afghan conflict,  which has two main consequences: the 
increase  of drug flows since the withdrawal of Russian troops and the  eased 
travelling of fundamentalist groups linked to the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. The 
second challenge are the autocratic and kleptocratic political nature of the Central 
Asian regimes and  their uncertain political future. The third factor  is the constant 
unwillingness of the republics to cooperate among themselves. The fourth factor is 
the competing mind-set for influence existing between the Russians, the Americans, 
the Chinese and the Europeans.    
Among these challenges, the importance of the security concerns related to 
drug flows (in particular organised crime, financing of terrorist groups) and of their 
economic and societal costs has been gradually recognised by the Russian and the 
EU authorities in several joint statements. In 2003, for instance, they noted that: 
Taking into account that this acute problem has spread far beyond the region 
and acquired a global nature, [they] reiterated their commitment to playing their 
part in international efforts to combat poppy and cannabis cultivation and drug 
production both on the territory of Afghanistan and in its neighbouring States.2 
 
Despite  such  statements,  both sides  have mainly continued to develop 
separate anti-drug strategies and instruments without setting up genuine coopera-
tion mechanisms. 
Focusing on the growing threat of drug trafficking coming from Afghanistan 
through Central Asia, this paper aims at analysing the EU-Russia interactions in this 
region on a highly relevant transnational security, societal and economic threat. It 
raises the question to  what extent the development of Russia-EU cooperation on 
tackling the common threat of narcotics in Central Asia is desirable and feasible. The 
approach chosen in this paper aims to take distance from those advocating a “new 
Great game”,3  which  makes  the region essentially  appear  as a zone  over which 
great powers struggle for influence.  
                                                 
1 A. Délétroz, “Les quatre défis des républiques d’Asie centrale”, Le Temps, 29 June 2010. 
2 “Joint Statement: EU-Russia Summit”, St. Petersburg, 31 May 2003. 
3 See also R.M. Freire and E.R. Kanet (eds.), Key Players and Regional Dynamics in Eurasia: The 
Return of the ‘Great Game’, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. EU Diplomacy Papers  9/2011 
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In order to provide an answer to  the  research  question, three interrelated 
guiding hypotheses are formulated: 
1.  Due to its still low and accommodative role in Central Asia, the EU appears to 
be a suitable partner for Russia which, on its side, acknowledges the 
imperative to share increasing costs related to the combat of drug flows. 
2.  The Central Asian countries would welcome this, as it could strengthen their 
own internal political control and contribute to respond to their security 
preoccupations through further securitisation. 
3.  The current competitive mind-set between the Russian and the European 
security interests is of higher security, societal and economic costs for both 
actors than investing in pragmatic cooperation mechanisms. 
To establish the basis on which Russia-EU cooperation can be built, the first 
argument stresses the growing overlap between the Russian and European security 
interests and provides an understanding of their mutual perceptions in the evolving 
security context of Central Asia. The second argument explains the different aspects 
calling for EU-Russia joint efforts to tackle narcotics trafficking coming from 
Afghanistan and Central Asia. It illustrates  the changes that  occurred in drug 
trafficking since the US-led coalition intervened in Afghanistan and the (in)adequacy 
of the responses provided by the Central Asian states to the multi-faceted conse-
quences of increasing drug flows. Finally, the deep impact of Central Asian domestic 
characteristics on regional and international cooperation is demonstrated. The third 
argument analyses the respective Russian and EU counter-narcotics strategies and 
instruments at three levels – the domestic level, the respective actions undertaken in 
Central Asia  and  the  initiatives promoting  international cooperation  –  in order to 
facilitate comparison and to assess the possibilities of developing synergies on the 
ground.  Overall, the paper argues that the setting up of  a pragmatic and de-
politicised cooperation between the EU and Russia appears to be very challenging 
while being desirable, as it would contribute to diminish strong risks of instability in the 
region and would address the security concerns of both actors. Based on  the 
findings, policy recommendations for the EU are formulated in the conclusions. 
 Nathan Dufour 
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2.   Russia-EU interactions regarding  Central Asia: overlapping  security 
interests and mutual perceptions 
 
In comparison with Russia, Iran, Turkey or the US, the European Union is a distant 
actor that can be qualified as a “late comer”4 in Central Asia, despite its economic 
assistance  to the region through the TACIS funds in the 1990s. Central Asia is, 
moreover, relatively new on the EU’s foreign policy agenda, but its importance has 
been growing since the 9/11 events and the military or logistical participation of 
some of the EU member states in the war efforts in Afghanistan. 
Notwithstanding a clear historical and political asymmetry of the roles of Russia 
and the EU in Central Asia, the growing security interests of the latter in this strategic 
region have undoubtedly led to rising interactions with Russia, which still considers the 
region as its natural sphere of influence. The first common interest that has provoked 
a diplomatic, political and economic (re-)investment of the two actors in the region 
is related to oil and gas resources, mainly in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and, to a lesser 
extent,  Uzbekistan. For Russia, the important hydrocarbon reserves and related 
pipeline networks, mostly inherited from the USSR, constitute important  levers  to 
project its power at the regional and global levels. For the EU, it is essentially a matter 
of energy security, as those resources could help diversify its gas and oil imports and 
would contribute to reduce its dependency on Russia. Therefore, the current mind-
set is clearly one of competitiveness, which has important implications not only in 
Central Asia, but also across the whole Eurasian continent. Thus, a short- or medium-
term step towards cooperation appears difficult to achieve. 
The second common security interest is directly related to the international 
efforts to stabilise Afghanistan  and to avoid spreading effects in neighbouring 
countries. This security threat is perceived as such by the whole ‘international 
community’, and many countries, among which Russia and the Central Asian states 
themselves,  have started to  support the efforts of the US-led coalition  notably 
through logistical and diplomatic support.5 In this respect, the Central Asian region 
has  become  increasingly  important from a  strategic  point of view,  both  for  the 
Russians and the Europeans. Nonetheless, their respective understanding of how to 
stabilise the region differs. While Russia considers it mostly as a buffer zone in which 
stability can only be reached through the promotion of strong and stable regimes, 
the Europeans apprehend it mostly through development and democratisation. If 
                                                 
4 G. Wiegand, Director for the EU’s relations with Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 
Directorate-General  External Relations,  European Commission, speech at the closing 
conference of the EU-Central Asia Monitoring (EUCAM) project, Centre for European Policy 
Studies (CEPS), Brussels, 22 February 2010. 
5 One notable example is the US initiative to set up a ‘Northern Distribution Network’ to face 
growing difficulties in the Pakistani supply routes. This initiative, aiming at facilitating the 
transportation of non-lethal materials now encompasses Latvia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.  EU Diplomacy Papers  9/2011 
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secured Southern borders have always been important to the Kremlin, the war in 
Afghanistan and an increased Western presence in Central Asia since 2001 have 
contributed to a renewed Russian perception of the threats coming from the region 
and of the imperative to act upstream for security. Furthermore, the securitisation of 
the 7000 km long Russo-Kazakh border would be far too expensive and, if done, 
would also entail a high risk of unwanted political consequences.6 Hence, in “the 
prevailing official Russian view, the ruling authoritarians are unlikely to be succeeded 
by enlightened democrats; rather, they are more likely to be replaced by Islamist 
radicals”.7 From an EU perspective, the security issues in Central Asia are  
embedded in a regional context that creates additional difficulties for 
engagement. Namely, while the Central Asian states may share a common 
understanding of ‘security challenges’,  that understanding differs considerably 
from accepted definitions within the EU.8  
 
Indeed, it seems that in the region “Russia has once more become the primary 
political model for the Central Asian regimes, which are attracted neither to Western 
parliamentary systems nor to Chinese monopartyism".9 Nevertheless, an opposition 
between a Russian status quo-centred approach (through bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation)  and  a European value-centred one (through development policies 
and political dialogue) does not allow a proper assessment of the situation. Despite 
regular emphasis put on democratisation and human rights in Central Asia,  
[t]he EU with its normative-civilian approach to foreign policy is hardly a serious 
concern here for Russia. This is especially true as the EU has always shown much 
sensitivity to the Kremlin’s geo-strategic concerns. For example, it was European 
pressure that drew up NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme with the Central 
Asian republics in such a way that would not give rise to significant Russian 
suspicion.10 
 
Moreover, the war in Afghanistan and its consequences in Central Asia have 
progressively  contributed to reducing  initial strong divergences on the method to 
adopt. Hence, in practical terms scholars noted a progressive reshaping of the EU’s 
Central Asian strategy towards a more realpolitik approach, focusing  
                                                 
6 D. Trofimov, “Russian foreign-policy objectives in Central Asia”, Russian Regional Perspectives 
Journal, vol. 1, no. 2, p. 15. 
7 D. Trenin, “Russia and Central Asia. Interests, Policies, and Prospects”, in E.B. Rumer, D. Trenin 
and H. Zhao (eds.), Central Asia: views from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing, Armonk, New 
York, M.E. Sharpe, 2007, p. 84. 
8 D.  Kimmage, “Security Challenges in Central Asia: Implications for the EU’s Engagement 
Strategy”, in N.J. Melvin (ed.), Engaging Central Asia: The European Union’s New Strategy in 
the Heart of Eurasia, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 2008, p. 9. 
9 M. Laruelle, “Russia in Central Asia: Old History, New Challenges?”, EUCAM Working Paper, 
no. 3, September 2009, p. 5. 
10 A. Warkotsch, “The EU and Central Asian geopolitics”, in A. Warkotsch (ed.), The European 
Union and Central Asia, London, Routledge, 2011, p. 65. Nathan Dufour 
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on securing access to the region’s energy supplies and to ensuring that the states 
of Central Asia assist western countries involved in the conflict in Afghanistan 
rather than promoting genuine long-term stability built on the emergence of civil 
society, rule of law and forms of democratic politics.11  
 
On the Russian side, the growing threats coming from Afghanistan through 
Central Asia have progressively encouraged Moscow to ‘share costs’ with external 
actors  –  provided that its strategic interests are considered. In this regard,  the 
tensions experienced by Russia and the EU in the ‘common neighbourhood’ or in the 
Caucasus can be qualified in the case of Central Asia, with the notable exception of 
hydrocarbons. Marlène Laruelle stresses that the EU is not perceived as a threat to 
the Russian interests in Central Asia, as appears to be the case for the US, and now 
also for China: 
Ce que j’ai vu du côté russe, c’est une perception plutôt positive, l’UE n’étant pas 
perçue comme un concurrent direct. Le vrai enjeu stratégique est soit, 
évidemment, l’obsession américaine au sens géopolitique, […] aidée par les 
révolutions, les think tanks etc., soit la peur montante de la Chine. L’UE arrive par 
un biais qui est différent et moins visible que les autres.12 
 
The EU, indeed, does not seek to become a monopolistic actor in the region 
(and probably does not have the means to do so). It has rather put strong emphasis 
on the importance of developing regional and international cooperation with all 
relevant actors on the ground. From that perspective, Russia cannot be ignored in 
implementing the EU’s policies in Central Asia, but this is not the case the other way 
around. Nevertheless, the European authorities have, so far, demonstrated “a 
tendency to view all previous developments in Central Asia as a waste […], a belief 
that Russia is irrelevant and has no role in the region, and an inclination to see 
Russia’s initiatives as potentially ineffective and doomed to failure”.13  
Furthermore, the EU Special Representative (EUSR)  for Central Asia expresses 
more clearly the fragile equilibrium of the EU’s position towards Russia in the region, 
aiming, on the one hand, at balancing the Russian geostrategic interests and, on the 
other, at developing its own path in its relations with the Central Asian states:  
Certes, la Russie est un pays majeur dans la région. Nous prenons le temps de leur 
expliquer afin qu’ils comprennent notre démarche. [...] Il ne faut tout de même 
pas aller trop loin, dans une espèce de verrouillage avec les russes. Nous gardons 
notre logique propre, nos critères n’étant  pas les leurs, les droits de l’homme, 
etc.14 
                                                 
11 N. Melvin and J. Boonstra, “The EU Strategy for Central Asia @ Year One”, EUCAM Policy 
Brief, no. 1, October 2008, p. 3. 
12 Interview with Marlène Laruelle, Senior Research Fellow with the Central Asia and Caucasus 
Institute & Silk Road Studies Programme, Brussels, 22 February 2010. 
13 A. Matveeva, “EU stakes in Central Asia”, Chaillot Paper, no. 91, July 2006, Paris, European 
Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), pp. 118-119. 
14  Interview  with  Pierre Morel, EU Special Representative for Central Asia and the Crisis in 
Georgia, Brussels, 2 February 2010. EU Diplomacy Papers  9/2011 
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While Russia still does not seem to consider the EU as a genuine foreign policy 
actor in Central Asia, Alexander Nikitin from the Moscow State Institute of 
International Relations (MGIMO)  esteems that Russia is asking for more EU 
involvement in the region: 
If the EU feels that the Caucasus and Moldova have become its ‘close 
neighbourhood’, and if the EU has interests in DRC Congo, Indonesia and the 
Middle East, why then is Central Asia (which is a serious crisis area) not considered 
by the EU as requiring European action?15  
 
Beyond  mutual  EU-Russian  perceptions, the Central Asian states now play a 
central role, as they have gradually been able to enhance their political autonomy 
by using competition between external actors, both for their resources and their 
geopolitical situation. Indeed, since the mid-1990s, the Central Asian states have 
tried, with varying success, to  diversify their security policies  and form new 
partnerships outside the context of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
or  of  bilateral agreements with Russia. The Central Asian leaders have gradually 
developed multi-directional foreign policies to be able to pursue their national and 
personal interests.16 From this point of view, the war in Afghanistan has helped these 
republics to increase their diversification strategies,  with  Uzbekistan, for example, 
using its geopolitical situation for Western operations in Afghanistan. 
Despite a relative recovery under Putin, this situation has strengthened two 
main factors that have led to a progressive questioning of Russia’s influence in the 
region. First, the Kremlin has steadily been pushed to share the management of the 
regional security burden and to coordinate its policies with external powers or within 
regional for a, such as the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Indeed, the Russian policy for Central 
Asia has been characterised “by a desire to retain its hegemonic position, in 
particular in the security sphere, but also by both an initial reluctance to engage 
actively in the region and a post-soviet decline in economic and military 
capabilities”.17  This, in turn, has “contributed to the uneven character of Russian 
influence in the region and the inability to prevent growing engagement in the 
region by ‘external’ actors”.18  
  Second, the strategic and security interests of other powers (like the EU, 
Japan, Turkey, Iran) have presented Central Asian elites with opportunities for a 
                                                 
15 A. Nikitin, “Russian Perceptions and Approaches to Cooperation in ESDP”, Analysis, Paris, 
European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), 29 May 2006, p. 2. 
16  E.  Azarkan, “The interests of the Central Asian states and the Shanghai cooperation 
organization”, Ege Academic Review, vol. 10, no. 1, 2010, p. 415. 
17  R.  Deyermond,  “Matrioshka hegemony? Multi-levelled hegemonic competition and 
security in post-Soviet Central Asia”, Review of International Studies, vol. 35, no. 1, 2009, p. 160. 
18 Ibid. Nathan Dufour 
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further strengthening of their room of manoeuvre. The outcome has therefore been 
twofold: reinforcement of a competing mind-set as for energy security, but also 
growing recognition of the potential gains from developing regional and/or inter-
national cooperation in security matters to respond to domestic securitisation 
problems.19  
 
3.   The war in Afghanistan and the ‘Northern route’ 
 
Before the breakdown of the USSR, the Western markets were essentially 
reached through Iran and Pakistan,  which constituted the traditional drug routes. 
With the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, “new routes began appearing into and 
through the former Soviet Central Asian republics. This new drug trade made its 
strongest initial inroads into Tajikistan, where the situation was exacerbated by the 
civil war between 1992-97”.20 Therefore, Central Asia has increasingly constituted a 
crucial corridor for smugglers to reach the extremely lucrative European and Russian 
markets. At the beginning of the 1990s, the  
Kharog-Osh road became one of the first focuses of regional and international 
anti-drug efforts. As it is common with smuggling, however, as soon as one route 
became more difficult, others opened up. While Afghanistan’s poppy crop 
probably doubled over the next two years, new smuggling routes appeared at 
other parts of its borders.21  
 
In 2010, the United Nations office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) pointed out 
that Afghanistan was the world leading producer of opiates (opium, heroine, 
morphine and other derivatives) accounting for 93 per cent of all poppy 
cultivation.22  Out of this, “[a]bout 80 per cent of the drugs derived from Afghan 
opium poppies are smuggled out by transnational organized criminal groups through 
the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan; the rest flows through Central Asia”.23 
As shown by the map  in Figure 1, the so-called  ‘Northern route’  is now 
constituted of a multiplicity of routes that smugglers use to transport opiates. 
 
                                                 
19  N.  Dufour,  "Les défis d’une coopération entre Moscou et Bruxelles en Asie central. Une 
asymétrie réelle ou fantasmée ?", Université Libre de Bruxelles, Institute for European Studies, 
2010, pp. 43-44. 
20 International Crisis Group, “Central Asia drugs and conflict”, ICG Asia Report, no. 25, 26 
November 2001, p. 2. 
21 Ibid. 
22 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “World Drug Report 2010”, Vienna, 
2010, p. 32. 
23 Ibid. EU Diplomacy Papers  9/2011 
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Figure 1: Opiates trafficking routes in Central Asia 
 
Source: UNODC, op.cit., 2009, p. 65. 
 
Drug traffickers transport opiates across the three bordering Central Asian 
states and, if not by air routes, have to cross Kazakhstan to reach Russia. 
Notwithstanding a clear lack of reliable data,24 increasing drug seizures “reported in 
Tajikistan confirm this country’s status as the gateway for drugs entering Central Asia 
in Afghanistan”.25  
  One of the most visible impacts of increasing amounts of drugs crossing the 
Afghan borders has been a  sharp rise of drug abuse rates  in the five  republics. 
Indeed, aside “from being transit zones for drug trafficking, the region has also 
become an active consumer of the most dangerous drug of modernity – heroin”.26 In 
comparison with the 1990s, the “easy availability of cheap heroin has changed the 
pattern of abuse and led to growing intravenous use of heroin […], creating serious 
problems with HIV/AIDS due to unsafe injecting practices”.27 Currently, heroin is the 
main illegal drug seized in Central Asia (together with Trans-Caucasian countries), 
with an increase from 144 kilos in 1996 to 3,688 kilos in 2006, representing a change of 
                                                 
24 This problem is still particularly relevant in the case of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. These 
two republics are clearly refractory to share information, be it with their neighbours or with 
international organisations.  
25 UNODC, “Illicit Drug Trends in Central Asia”, Regional Office for Central Asia, April 2008, p. 
13. 
26 K. Osmonaliev, “Developing Counter-Narcotics Policy in Central Asia. Legal and Political 
Dimensions”, Silk Road Paper, Central Asia– Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Studies Programme, 
January 2005, p. 15. 
27 UNODC, “Illicit Drug Trends in Central Asia”, op.cit., p. 16. Nathan Dufour 
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2,461 per cent.28 From that perspective, it is quite clear that “Afghan drug trafficking 
to a great extent [… will continue to influence] the drug situation in Central Asia and 
the populations of the region hostages of this world’s fastest-growing drug 
producer”.29  
Comparing the different routes used by smugglers from Afghanistan to reach 
the Russian and European markets is crucial to understand the political significance 
of counter-narcotics actions in Central Asia from both perspectives. From the Russian 
perspective, the ‘Northern route’ is by far the most important one. Indeed, UNODC 
reveals that an estimated 75-80 tons of heroin flow to Russia via the Central Asian 
countries, crossing the  borders  of Afghanistan with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and 
particularly Tajikistan.30 Indeed, 
Russia consumes only slightly less heroin each year than does the rest of Europe 
combined (70 tons versus 88 tons). Out of about 100,000 drug addicts dying each 
year worldwide, between 30,000 and 40,000 are Russians. Russian officials point 
out that the production of narcotics in Afghanistan has grown exponentially […] 
since the fall of the Taliban and the arrival of the coalition forces.31 
 
From a European perspective, the ‘Northern route’ represents ‘only’ one of the 
routes used by drug smugglers to supply the European markets, among which the 
most important one is the ‘Balkan route’. In total, 30 per cent of the Afghan heroin 
production (about 110 tons) is smuggled into Europe, of which 80 per cent reaches 
the European markets through the Balkans, after crossing the Islamic Republic of Iran 
and Turkey. The rest, still representing important quantities, “comes via the Russian 
Federation (Central Asia-Russia), the Black Sea route (Iran-Azerbaijan-Georgia-Black 
Sea), Pakistan (by air), Africa (by air and sea) and South-East Asia (by air)”.32 
Moreover, the ‘Black Sea route’  through the Caucasus seems to be increasingly 
used, probably because of instability elsewhere in recent years.33 
Altogether, the European and Russian markets account for 46 per cent of the 
global opiate market value, estimated at between 60 and 65 billion US dollars.34 In 
comparison with the about one billion US dollars per year of income for Afghan 
farmers, opiate trafficking appears much more lucrative outside the Afghan borders 
than within. Therefore, the fight against illicit opiate traffic undoubtedly “requires a 
                                                 
28  UNODC, “Addiction, crime and insurgency: The transnational threat of Afghan opium”, 
Vienna, October, 2009, p. 33. 
29 Osmonaliev, op.cit., p. 25. 
30 UNODC, “Addiction, Crime and Insurgency”, op.cit., p. 13. 
31 D. Trenin and A. Malashenko, “Afghanistan – A view from Moscow”, Moscow, Carnegie 
Endowment for Peace, April 2010, p. 14.  
32 UNODC, “Addiction, Crime and Insurgency”, op.cit., p. 11. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., p. 66. EU Diplomacy Papers  9/2011 
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concerted effort, not just from Afghanistan, but also its neighbours with support of the 
international community”.35 
 
3.1   Drug-trafficking as an endemic and multi-faceted problem: insufficiency 
and inadequacy of the local responses  
 
Since the beginning of the Afghan campaign, each  of  Afghanistan’s 
neighbours has been put under tight pressure. Widespread corruption, including at 
the highest level of the states’ apparatuses, financing of organised crime networks 
(related or not to religious extremists and terrorists), worsening of already poor living 
conditions and growing health problems related to drug consumption appear as the 
many detrimental factors resulting from narcotic flows crossing the Afghan borders. 
In short, it is regularly emphasised by numerous reports  that  drug trafficking 
“threatens security  and development by enriching and empowering organized 
criminal groups, creating instability and feeding corruption”.36  
  On  the  one hand, it is impossible to comprehend  properly  the  endemic 
problems of instability and corruption existing in Central Asia without acknowledging 
the magnitude of the drug trade.37 On the other hand, however, it is also impossible 
to properly assess the impact of drug trafficking in the region without bearing in mind 
the political nature of the Central Asian states, notably when it comes to  the 
efficiency of counter-narcotics policies. Both factors are reinforcing each other and 
lead to a highly insecure and unstable politico-economic environment in the Central 
Asian states and societies. 
  Even if some variations exist, the Central Asian states can be apprehended as 
neo-patrimonial regimes38  which  have experienced a gradual or rapid closure of 
their political systems and a significant tightening of authoritarian practices in the 
1990s. All of this has contributed to a drift towards a cult of personality more or less 
marked in each republic.39 Freedom House’s 2010 survey on political rights and civil 
liberties puts further emphasis on the repressive nature of the regimes. All five Central 
Asian  republics are ranked in the non-free  category (out of  47 countries),  while 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are said to be among the ‘worst of the worst’ countries 
                                                 
35 UNODC, “Briefing Note”, 3 March 2011, p. 1. 
36 UNODC, “World Drug Report”, op.cit., p. 32. 
37  R.  McDermott, “Border Security in Tajikistan: Countering  the Narcotics Trade?”, London, 
Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, 2002, p. 1. 
38 See J. Ishiyama, “Neopatrimonialism and the prospects for democratization in the Central 
Asian republics”, in  N.S.  Cummings  (ed.),  Power and Change in Central Asia, London, 
Routledge, 2002, p. 43. 
39 M. Laruelle and S. Peyrouse, "Asie centrale, la dérive autoritaire. Cinq républiques entre 
héritage soviétique, dictature et islam", Paris, Éditions Autrement, collection CERI/AUTREMENT, 
2006, p. 31. Nathan Dufour 
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on earth (with North Korea, Sudan, Somalia, Burma, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea and 
Libya).40 
  Thus, the Central Asian states’ neo-patrimonial authority and power structures 
constitute undeniable factors explaining the difficulties in establishing efficient 
counter-narcotic policies at the domestic level. The main element is the depend-
ence on personalism and presidential clans which rely on corruption practices and 
are being further reinforced by the increasing amounts of drug flows and a general 
worsening of the  living conditions. Indeed, “all indicators point to an association 
between patrimonial authoritarian regimes and a highly corrupt political and 
economic climate in Central Asia”.41  This climate makes the fight against drug 
trafficking extremely difficult, particularly in unstable countries like Tajikistan and its 
porous borders or Kyrgyzstan, where the southern part is now believed to be under 
the control of mafias. As explained by Alain Délétroz,  
Ce qui est arrivé au Kirghizistan risque fortement de se produire au Tadjikistan, à 
moins qu’il n’y ait pas besoin de le faire. En effet, les mafieux liés aux trafics de 
drogue n’ont peut-être pas besoin de se lancer directement dans des opérations 
de déstabilisation  au Tadjikistan parce que les autorités-mêmes du pays sont 
mêlées à ces trafics et que les routes y sont déjà bien implantées. On pardonne 
aux Tadjiks de ne pas arriver à contrôler le Pamir, mais lorsqu’ils n’arrivent pas à 
contrôler l’aéroport de Douchanbé nous rencontrons un sérieux problème.42  
 
Indeed, the 
drug business generates enormous profits and the temptation to grab a cut 
creates favourable conditions for corruption in law enforcement agencies. 
Corruption as a form of social pathology related to patronage and cooperation 
with criminals, promotes a significant increase in drug trafficking. Drug-related 
corruption includes not only basic bribery of public officials but also any actions 
assisting and developing drug businesses, such as officers covering sales of heroin 
on the streets and in drug dens in return for remuneration.43  
 
The growing recognition of drug trafficking as a threat has been slow to 
emerge while a sharp rise in drug addiction took place already in the 1990s, after the 
Soviet withdrawal.44 This was partly due to 
a political culture in which it was not considered acceptable to advertise a drug 
problem. Partly it was because the states had no resources, or obvious incentive, 
in the immediate post-Soviet period to set up agencies that could track the 
problem. […] Above all, the economic and political clout of the drug trade made 
it difficult for the state to crack down.45 
                                                 
40 See Press release of the Freedom House report, “Freedom in the World 2010: Global Erosion 
of Freedom”, Washington, D.C., 12 January 2010. 
41 K. Collins, “Economic and Security Regionalism among Patrimonial Authoritarian Regimes: 
The Case of Central Asia”, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 61, no. 2, March 2009, p. 267. 
42 Interview with Alain Délétroz, op.cit. 
43 Osmonaliev, op.cit., p. 22. 
44 International Crisis Group, op.cit., p. 1. 
45 Ibid. EU Diplomacy Papers  9/2011 
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By the end of the 1990s, Central Asian states nevertheless began to express their 
alert about negative impacts of drug trafficking on their national security, and they 
started to develop national counter-narcotic policies as well as setting up 
committees to implement them. All five neo-patrimonial states, however, “generally 
cling to restrictive counter-narcotics policies, although there are some differences 
among them in their legal and administrative nuances”.46  On this point, the final 
declaration of the ‘Paris Pact Initiative’ in 2003 reiterated that  
[i]n the countries affected by the drug routes, strategies to fight drug trafficking 
and drug addiction should correspond to a balanced approach between 
repression of traffickers, prevention of drug addiction and treatment of drug 
addicts, in compliance with the United Nations recommendations.47 
 
By considering the current trends in drug trafficking and related security, 
societal and health issues in Central Asia, Osmonaliev stresses that the following 
developments can be forecast with a certain degree of confidence:  
-  The trend of continuously increasing demand for drugs in the countries of 
Europe, CIS and Central Asia in particular will persist; 
-  As a result, [there is a high possibility of an increase in] the transit of drugs of 
Afghan origin […]. This is likely because of a range of factors – a huge amount 
of opium cultivation in Afghanistan; continuous increase of heroin production; 
and a probable escalation of international terrorists’ activity on the territories of 
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan […];  
-  Growth of criminal activity, especially more sophisticated crimes in Central 
Asia […];  
-  Concurrently, the number of drug addicts will increase, particularly intravenous 
drug users; 
-  […T]he level of corruption in law enforcement agencies […] will also increase; 
-  [Finally,] the potential pervasiveness, due to its dormant character, of criminal 
activity is steadily increasing given the re-orientation of significant layers of the 
population toward criminal-type relations, and behaviour in the conscience of 
citizens. This is being expressed in the form of legal nihilism and a more tolerant 
attitude towards drug addiction as well as towards narcotic-related criminal 
activities.48 
 
3.2  Limits to regional and international cooperation: the distrust factor 
 
Considering the influence of the Afghan factor and the incapacity of the 
Central Asian republics to deal alone with this situation, it appears crucial to support 
them through the establishment of cooperation mechanisms at both regional and 
international levels. 
                                                 
46 Osmonaliev, op.cit., p. 6. 
47 Ministerial Conference on drug routes from Central Asia to Europe, “Paris Statement”, Paris, 
21-22 May 2003, p. 3. 
48 Osmonaliev, op.cit., pp. 23-24. Nathan Dufour 
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Trying to understand why most attempts to create regional cooperation failed 
to produce results in Central Asia, Kathleen Collins stresses that there is a causal link 
between regionalism49 and the patrimonial nature of these regimes. She emphasises 
that “patrimonial authoritarian regimes act to ensure their survival and maximise their 
personal enrichment; doing so negatively affects economic regionalism, but security-
oriented regionalism may be possible if the member states agree on a common 
threat”.50 In her opinion, Central Asian authoritarian leaders therefore “are more likely 
to pursue regionalism in security affairs when it promotes their overarching goal, 
political survival, without threatening rent-seeking”.51 In this regard, the most notice-
able examples are those of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the 
Collective Security Treaty Organisation,  which have both contributed to create a 
common perception of security issues, notably through the ‘non-interference’ 
principle in internal affairs. 
In spite of growing awareness of drug-related threats on national security, no 
adequate cooperation in the field of counter-narcotics has been set-up so far. In 
Alain Délétroz’s view,  
Outre les trafics de drogue, les Etats d’Asie centrale rencontrent  un énorme 
problème de coopération régionale dans tous les domaines. La question des 
trafics de drogue est d’autant plus affligeante que celle-ci touche à la sécurité. 
Tous ces services de sécurité, ou du moins leurs dirigeants, sont issus de la même 
école [en référence au KGB] […] mais se méfient ‘comme de la peste’ les uns des 
autres. […] Ce climat de  méfiance  génère  de graves répercussions à l’heure 
actuelle. Cela sera d’autant plus le cas le jour où l’OTAN quittera l’Afghanistan car 
il ne fait aucun doute que les Talibans reviendront sur le devant de la scène. […] 
Pour ces pays, cela constituera un défi sécuritaire énorme.52 
 
This general distrust among Central Asian states plays not only a crucial role at 
the regional level but also carries a high responsibility in hampering the successful 
quest for international efforts. Thus, broadening  
international cooperation in counter-narcotics is impossible without effective 
domestic legislation. It should be aimed at preserving and developing business 
contacts and encouraging multilateral cooperation between law enforcement 
agencies, including relevant international organizations.53 
 
As explained by UNODC, the trust-building factor is central for combating illicit 
drug trafficking, but it also requires “well-organized systems of information collection, 
                                                 
49  Based on previous literature, Collins explains that regionalism “refers not just to a 
concentration of economic activity, but to a ‘political process’ characterized by policy 
cooperation, coordination, and possibly institutionalisation in any of several issue areas: 
economic, political, social, environmental and security”. See Collins, op.cit., p. 251. 
50 Ibid., p. 254. 
51 Ibid., pp. 256-257. 
52 Interview with Alain Délétroz, op.cit. 
53 Osmonaliev, op.cit., p. 49. EU Diplomacy Papers  9/2011 
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processing and analysis, as well as the exchange of the final information product 
among agencies involved at national and regional levels”.54 In the case of Tajikistan 
and Kyrgyzstan, both states face increasing domestic difficulties to keep control over 
their territories and, therefore, to implement their counter-narcotics policies. In April 
2010, “violent rebellion swept into the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek […], sparked by anger at 
painful utility price increases and the corruption that was the defining characteristic 
of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s rule”.55 In Délétroz’s analysis, the pogroms of last 
year can be perceived as the result of a reshaping in the drug trafficking dividends in 
Central Asia. The Osh-Jalal-Abad route is still out of the Bishkek government’s control 
and the new owners refuse to implement the decrees coming from the Kyrgyz 
capital.56 The importance of this route for drug flows coming from Afghanistan and 
the relation with the pogroms is supported by the data available on drug seizures 
carried out in 2006 in the Osh province, as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Heroin seizures by province in Kyrgyzstan, 2006 
 
Source: UNODC, 2008, p.12. 
 
  In Tajikistan, the whole system is severely hit by endemic corruption, including 
in the law enforcement agencies, and faces additional poverty and under-
development problems,  as it is the poorer country of the CIS. Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan maintain, so far, a high level of control on the states’ apparatuses and 
have  more economic resources  than Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to ensure a more 
effective patrolling of their borders.57 
                                                 
54 UNODC, “Briefing Note”, op.cit., p. 1. 
55 International Crisis Group, “Kyrgyzstan: A Hollow Regime Collapses”, Policy Briefing,  Asia 
Briefing, no. 102, Bishkek/Brussels, April 2010, p. 1. 
56 Interview with Alain Délétroz, op.cit. 
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  On top of  the  still strong Soviet-style component in the management of   
borders by the Central Asian states, there are variations between their institutional 
arrangements to ensure border security. This  makes  it even more difficult to 
coordinate at the regional level. For instance, “in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Turkmenistan, border management is performed by ‘border service’ (pogranichnaya 
sluzhba), [while] Uzbekistan and Tajikistan continue the Soviet tradition of employing 
‘border troops’ (pogranichnyye voyska) to perform border security tasks”.58 Despite 
this general distrust and differences between them, all Central Asian states (except 
for Turkmenistan)  
give high priority to the development and strengthening of international 
relations and cooperation within the framework of the UN, the OSCE, the ECO, 
and through other bilateral and multilateral mechanisms as well as with external 
powers such as the European Union and the United States.59 
 
Nevertheless, it can also be noted that the multiplicity of donors, and their 
different understandings,  contribute to the difficulties in developing efficient anti-
drug policies in the region. 
 
4.  The Russian and EU counter-narcotics approaches and instruments  
 
4.1  The approach of the Russian Federation: the primacy of security 
 
As mentioned, Russia perceives itself directly threatened by the drug situation in 
Afghanistan and its spreading in Central Asia. As a result, Russia has shown growing 
commitment to fight against drugs  both through the adoption of domestic 
instruments and by actively calling for regional and international cooperation.   
 
4.1.1  The new Russian anti-drug policy strategy and its implementation 
 
The Russian government recently adopted two fundamental documents 
defining its approach towards drug flows and related problems: the “State Anti-Drug 
Policy Strategy of the Russian Federation in the Period until 2020”,  adopted by a 
presidential decree in June 2010; and the “Plan for the Implementation of the State 
Anti-Drug Policy Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020”, following a decision of 
the State Anti-Drug Committee in September 2010. 
  As defined in the Strategy, the Russian Federation’s main counter-narcotics 
objective is “the substantial reduction of illicit trade and non-medical use of drugs, 
[and the reduction of the] impact of illicit trade on the safety and health of the 
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person, the society and the state”.60 In order to reach this objective, the Strategy 
aims to balance three main measures in accordance with the UN recommendations: 
reducing the supply of drugs; reducing the demand of drugs  and  enhancing 
international cooperation in drug control.61  
  An important aspect defining the Russian approach to tackle drug supply 
from Afghanistan and Central Asia is the aim to develop an ‘anti-drug smuggling 
system’. Article 14 of the Implementation Plan mentions two important measures: the 
enhancement of border control and the establishment of international cooperation 
“with a view to increase the potential for the disruption of cultivation of drug-
containing plants, production of drugs in Afghanistan and drug trafficking in transit 
countries”.62  
  Moreover, the document enumerates Russia’s top priorities in the international 
cooperation on drug control.63  Apart from a clear focus on Afghanistan and the 
‘Northern route’, two objectives express in particular the Russian understanding of 
drug threats coming from Central Asia. The Kremlin aims to  develop regional 
cooperation in drug control, mentioning the main regional organisations responsible 
for security in the region, such as the CSTO and the SCO. By doing so, the explicit aim 
is to establish and strengthen financial and anti-drug  ‘security belts’  around 
Afghanistan,  in order to contain the proliferation of threats in the region. Finally, 
Russia also considers developing ‘joint efforts’ with representatives of NATO, the US 
and the EU. 
  In the  views  of the  International Drug Policy Consortium,64  however, the 
Strategy and its implementation clearly “overemphasise drug control at the expense 
of drug demand reduction and measures to reduce health-related harms of 
drugs”.65  It was also noted in the Consortium’s report  that the objectives set for 
reduction of drug demand do not comply with Russia’s commitments in the 2009 
Political Declaration and its Plan of Action adopted during the 52nd session of the UN 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs, and potentially  contain  counter-productive 
measures. Therefore, the Russian drug policy should reject the repressive approach 
and focus on human rights, protection of dignity and health and ensuring  the 
                                                 
60 For more details, see Russian Federation, “Plan for the Implementation of the State Anti-
Drug Policy Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020”, article 4. 
61 Ibid., article 5. 
62 Ibid., article 14. 
63 Ibid., article 40. 
64  The International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC) is a global network of 75 NGOs and 
professional networks that specialise in issues related to the production and use of controlled 
drugs. For more information, see: http://idpc.net/about 
65 International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC), “Report on the course of implementation by 
the Russian Federation of the Political Declaration and Plan of Action on International 
Cooperation towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter the World  Drug 
Problem”, Moscow, 2011, p. 2. Nathan Dufour 
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meaningful involvement of civil society, including active drug users,  in the 
development, adoption, implementation and evaluation of the policy.66 
  As a result, the way the Kremlin deals with drug problems domestically has a 
strong influence on its regional and bilateral actions in Central Asia. 
 
4.1.2  The promotion of regional security organisations 
 
  In recent years, the Russian  approach  towards security issues has evolved 
towards a more pragmatic stance. While throughout the 1990s “Russian efforts to 
coordinate the security agenda in Central Asia were managed through bilateral 
agreements, since 2001 the responsibility for regional security has shifted to 
multilateral frameworks”.67  Two major regional organisations are devoted to the 
management of security issues and to the development of a common security 
agenda in Central Asia: the Collective Security Treaty Organisation,68 a Russian-led 
politico-military organisation including  four of the Central Asian states (without 
Turkmenistan), Armenia and Belarus; and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation,69 
a rather Chinese-led organisation including Russia and the same four Central Asian 
states. 
  The forms of multilateral cooperation developed by these two organisations 
can be summarised as follow:   
-  elaboration of common concepts and strategic approaches to national 
and international security […]; 
-  carrying out multilateral training exercises by units of the armed forces to 
establish practical procedures to be adopted in case of the emergence of 
a real threat to national or regional security; 
-  multilateral cooperation by the countries' security structures in existing 
international anti-terrorist organisations to counter international terrorism and 
extremism, drug trafficking, and other trans-national threats; 
-  taking the first steps towards multilateral cooperation in preserving and 
expanding the links between industrial organisations involved in the 
manufacture of military hardware.70  
 
  From a Russian perspective, the promotion of these regional organisations is 
beneficial for three main reasons: firstly, because it allows the Kremlin to promote its 
                                                 
66 Ibid., p. 13. 
67 A. Frost, “The CSTO, the SCO and Russia’s Strategic Goals in Central Asia”, The China and 
Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Programme, vol. 
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68 The CSTO was created in 2002 following a reform of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States.  
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security preoccupations and appears to be an important vector for maintaining 
military and political influence, particularly through the CSTO.71 Secondly, Russia – as 
well as China and the Central Asian states – consider the repeated Western calls for 
democratisation as a destabilising factor and Moscow  has  adopted  a discourse 
promoting  ‘non-interference’  in domestic affairs to deal with security issues. The 
emphasis has, therefore, been put on secured and militarised borders or joint military 
manoeuvres, for which one of the most recent emblematic examples was the setting 
up of a CSTO’s rapid-reaction force in 2009.72  Finally, it can be argued that this 
strategy constitutes an incentive for Central Asian states to combine their forces and, 
by extent, to reduce security costs for Russia. 
   From the perspectives of the four Central Asian states, the development of 
these two regional frameworks fits with their respective domestic interests, as it allows 
them to “continue the multidirectional policy towards the major powers that have 
expressed willingness to develop and secure Central Asia”.73 Moreover, it can be 
noted that the principle of ‘non-interference’  and the repeated commitment to 
respect the political and social particularities of the members have permitted the 
Central Asian leaders to take part in multilateral fora without being criticised for their 
regimes’ characteristics.74 
  Yet, despite a ‘natural’ inclination for security regionalism, as it is the case for 
counter-terrorism75 and border disputes resolution, these two regional organisations 
have  not  been able so far to promote comprehensive responses to the multi-
facetted nature of the drug problem. If the most important achievement of those 
two organisations in Central Asia has been the development of common discourses 
on security threats, the current developments and the focus on repressive aspects 
clearly hamper the successful quest to establish efficient international cooperation. 
After the Kyrgyz events in 2010, some observers have further deplored the incapacity 
of both the CSTO and the SCO to provide quick and genuine responses to a serious 
crisis happening on the territory of one of the organisations’ members.76 
                                                 
71  M.  Laruelle and S.  Peyrouse, "Recomposition géopolitique sur le vieux continent ?", in L. 
Delcour  et al., "Vers un nouveau partage du  monde ?",  IRIS  -  La revue internationale et 
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73 Azarkan, op.cit., p. 415. 
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4.1.3  The promotion of international cooperation and initiatives 
 
  In line with its anti-drug strategy, and as a complement to its regional 
approach, the Russian Federation has pushed for a growing involvement of the 
international community through several initiatives. In 2009, it proposed to the UN the 
so-called ‘Rainbow 2’  Plan77  involving  Afghanistan, Pakistan and Tajikistan, thus 
clearly reiterating Russia’s wariness and perception about increasing drug flows and 
consumption on its territory.  In point five, the Plan  expresses  Russia’s  anger  with 
regard to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan because of 
the refusal of several NATO members to launch systematic eradication operations on 
poppy crops.78 This refusal is recurrently justified by the risk of provoking hostilities from 
Afghan farmers which would  further  complicate  the work of the coalition on the 
ground. This frustration has to be understood in the context of the ambiguity of the 
Russian approach towards Afghanistan. Indeed, Russia has on many occasions 
expressed the importance of stabilising the country for its own security but, in the 
meantime, the ‘Afghan trauma’, which followed the Soviet invasion, still constitutes a 
strong psychological barrier for further engagement. On this point, Dmitri Rogozin, 
the Russian Permanent Representative to NATO, clearly stated that no Russian 
soldiers will be sent to Afghanistan.79  
  Another important initiative characterising Russia’s readiness to work on the 
drug problems has been the reinforcement of Russia-NATO relations despite historical 
distrust and tensions, including  over Central Asia. The NATO-Russia Council has 
launched a training programme for Afghan and Central Asian law enforcement 
personnel for the period 2006-2011 that “includes on-site examination, search, 
disclosure and shutting down of illegal laboratories, and other essential counter-
narcotics strategies and techniques”.80 Following training sessions by UNODC experts, 
it was said that the biggest drug seizure ever was carried out by Uzbek officers: an 
amount of 568 kg of heroin.81  
  Furthermore, increasing cooperation with the US was also launched through 
the Drug Trafficking Working Group of the Russia-US Bilateral Presidential Commission. 
 
                                                 
77  Available at:  www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan//Events/Russian_Plan_ 
Rainbow_2.pdf 
78 P.F.P. Nopens, “Countering Afghan narcotics: a litmus test for effective NATO and Russia 
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4.2  The  approach of the European Union: focus on coordination and 
cooperation 
 
The development of counter-narcotics policies at the European Union level 
has to be seen in the context of the geographical situation of the EU, which makes it 
extremely vulnerable to drug flows coming from the West (Americas), from the East 
(mainly Afghanistan) but also from the South (Africa). With the progressive removal of 
internal borders, the EU has become  
an ever more attractive market for illegal drugs and the diversion of precursors. 
Once inside the Union’s borders, illegal products can be traded more or less freely 
without attracting the attention of customs or nationally-oriented law  enforce-
ment authorities.82  
 
Consequently, the authorities of the EU member states have progressively 
acknowledged the need to develop common strategies and instruments to properly 
respond to these transnational threats. Indeed, the “drugs problem is experienced 
primarily at local and national level, but it is a global issue that needs to be 
addressed in a transnational context”.83 
This increasing interdependence between internal and external security is, 
furthermore,  to be understood in the context of broader efforts within the EU to 
establish “closer coordination and cooperation between the institutions and actors 
chiefly concerned with internal security and those dealing with external security”.84   
 
4.2.1 The EU Drugs Strategy (2005-2012) and its Action  Plan: the challenge of 
coordinating internal and external policies 
 
Two main documents have to be considered when looking at the current EU 
counter-narcotics policy: the EU Drugs Strategy (2005-2012),  adopted by the 
European Council in December 2004; and the EU Drugs Action Plan (2009-2012), 
adopted in February 2005. Within this framework, the information on the drug 
situation in the EU is provided by the annual reports of Europol and of the European 
Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction's (EMCDDA),85 while the Commission 
is responsible, with the support of the member states, for the overall and continuous 
evaluation of the Strategy and Action Plan.86 Bearing in mind the multi-level nature of 
the EU’s system of governance, it is essential to mention here that the aim of this 
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83 Ibid., p. 3. 
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Strategy “is to add value to national strategies while respecting the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality set out in the Treaties”.87 At the EU domestic level, the 
Strategy calls for: 
a balanced and integrated approach to the drugs problem. It concentrates on 
the two major aspects of drug policy, demand reduction and supply reduction, 
and also covers a number of cross-cutting themes: international cooperation, 
research, information and evaluation.88 
 
Moreover,  the  Strategy  strongly emphasises the need for coordination and 
cooperation among EU  member states.  It stresses the horizontal nature of drug 
problems and states that 
this cooperation and coordination will need to be further developed not only in 
numerous sectors, including welfare, health, education and justice and home 
affairs, but also in relations with non-Member States and relevant international 
fora.89 
 
  For the purpose of enhancing the overall coherence of the Strategy, the 
Horizontal Working Party on Drugs (HDG) was  set-up in order to monitor “the 
implementation of the actions set out in the future EU Action Plans on Drugs, as well 
as having a leading role in coordinating the work of the other Council working 
groups on drug issues”.90 Furthermore, “the HDG should regularly devote attention to 
external aspects of drugs policy. It should provide for the exchange of information 
and prepare EU common positions on the external relations elements of the EU’s 
drug policy”.91  On the external relations aspects, the Strategy mentions the 
imperative to adopt a comprehensive and balanced approach  
that includes law enforcement, eradication, demand reduction and alternative 
livelihoods and alternative development initiatives backed by local 
communities. Third country drug programmes are unlikely to succeed unless all 
four elements are tackled together, with increased commitment of the 
European Union and the Member States.92 
 
  The EU’s Strategy defines, in its article 30, several priorities for international drug 
control cooperation.93 The third priority is crucial to understand the EU’s involvement 
towards drug trafficking in Central Asia. Indeed, the Strategy clearly stresses that the 
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“efforts of the EU should be based both on the relevance of the particular country or 
region to the drugs problem in the Union and on the impact of the drugs problem on 
sustainable development in that country or region”.94  
  As already explained, the ‘Northern route’ appears as an increasingly 
important drug route coming from Afghanistan and reaching the European markets, 
but it is not the main one, as it is the case for the Russian Federation. This has a clear 
impact on the EU’s involvement in Central Asia for counter-narcotics. Indeed, the 
geopolitical position of the EU makes it extremely attractive for drug trafficking 
coming from many places in the world, notably for transatlantic cocaine traffics:  
It is clear that any policy can only be effective if it establishes clear priorities. The EU 
Drugs Action Plans and mechanisms with other regions, notably the EU/LAC high-level 
mechanism on drugs, should remain a cornerstone of the Union’s drugs cooperation 
with them.95 
 
  The EU, therefore, intends to develop a balanced approach between 
Western, Eastern and Southern drug flows according to its member states’ 
preoccupations. As part of the law enforcement aspect of the Strategy and its 
Action Plan, the Council noted in 2010, in a document called “The European pact to 
combat international drug trafficking – disrupting cocaine and heroin routes”, that: 
We [the member states] shall ‘share our tasks’ within the European Union. In this 
way, groups of Member States and the Commission can unite their efforts and 
give priority use of their resources to the kind of combat they are best equipped 
for, while benefiting from the actions carried out by their partners against other 
forms of trafficking. For example, the experience of Member States in tackling the 
trafficking in cocaine in the Western route and the equivalent for those Member 
States in tackling the trafficking in heroin on the Eastern route should be 
capitalised upon.96 
 
  In parallel to the Drugs Strategy (2005-2012), the EU has also experienced a 
substantial institutional change with the Lisbon Treaty which entered into force on 1 
December 2009. Among the changes related to counter-narcotics,  
the trafficking of illicit drugs is addressed in the area of freedom, security and 
justice (Article 83), which provides for the establishment of minimum rules 
concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions. The Treaty [also] 
allows for the establishment of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office, with the 
possibility of expanding its power to include serious crime having a cross-border 
dimension (Article 86). This could, eventually, lead to certain drug trafficking 
offences being prosecuted at EU level.97 
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4.2.2  Limits of the EU’s regional approach in Central Asia 
 
  Two main documents now define the EU’s approach towards Central Asia: the 
Strategy for a New Partnership and the Regional Strategy paper 2007-2013, both 
adopted by the Council in 2007. Despite a general shift towards a more bilateral 
approach to respond to the specific needs of each Central Asian state, the Strategy 
clearly stresses the need for a regional approach in  
tackling common regional challenges such as organised crime, human, drugs 
and arms trafficking, terrorism and non-proliferation issues, inter-cultural dialogue, 
energy, environmental pollution, water management, migration as well as border 
management and transport infrastructure. In this regard the EU will cooperate 
with international ﬁnancial institutions, multilateral and regional organisations and 
institutions.98 
 
  Moreover, two interrelated EU regional programmes are specifically devoted 
to border management and drug trafficking in Central Asia, “whose long term 
strategic goal is the gradual adoption of EU standards and good practices”:99 the 
Central Asia Drugs Assistance Programme (CADAP) and the Border Management for 
Central Asia programme (BOMCA).  Their  organisations were merged in May 2004 
although their objectives remained separate.100 In practical terms, given “that many 
activities in the area of drug supply reduction are border-related and thus to be 
covered under BOMCA, […] [CADAP] mainly focus[es] on activities in the area of 
drug demand reduction”.101 After the 9/11 events, the EU started focusing on the 
security sector and more particularly on the issue of border management. This 
initiative has notably contributed to a strengthening of CADAP, “which had been 
launched in the late 1990s but had found it hard to have a significant impact on the 
ground”.102  
  Despite  the  relative success of BOMCA, notably by including Turkmen 
authorities and developing ‘good practices’  in the region, the programme  has 
experienced several important difficulties. The first relevant issue is related to the still 
politicised character of counter-narcotics policies and funds and to the perceptions 
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of the different actors involved. As part of the international cooperation component 
of the EU Drug Strategy (2005-2012), the “2009-2013 Action Plan on Drugs between 
the EU and Central Asian States”103 provides the EU with a comprehensive document 
on its counter-narcotics involvement in Central Asia. The document clearly states 
that the current competing climate is extremely challenging to develop efficient 
counter-narcotics policies in the region.  Among others, it mentions the limited 
“cooperation between Central Asian countries, insufficient domestic inter-agency 
co-ordination in the region, and limited co-ordination among the major international 
donors, as well as between the donors and the states in the region”.104 
  The second difficulty is related to the different conceptions of border security 
issues that exist between the European and the Central Asian states. In practice, it 
seems indeed that  
the EU has neglected the characteristic features of the situation on the ground, 
such as the Soviet-type militarized approach to border security, which differs 
markedly from the European model, and the limits to cooperation between the 
region’s states.105 
 
  Most significantly, one can  argue that BOMCA, which is the only genuine 
practical cooperation between the EU and Central Asian states, somehow reinforces 
the  Central Asian states’ neo-patrimonial authority and power structures when 
focusing on the securitisation of states’ borders. This “fortifies Central Asian regimes’ 
domination of their societies and, in turn, may increase the clandestine resistance 
which they face”.106  This, in turn, presents the EU’s programmes with a clear 
coherency dilemma, notably when it comes to the promotion of a balanced 
approach in counter-narcotics (border management with supply and demand 
reduction), as stated in the EU Drugs Strategy. This observation can be more broadly 
linked to the overall difficulties to define the EU’s Central Asian policy. But it also 
shows the EU’s readiness to play a more pragmatic role in counter-narcotics as a 
way to engage with local and regional actors on the ground. Nevertheless, the 
current trends show that  
  EU security assistance programmes at best remain limited and at worst have 
unintended outcomes which hinder the achievement of broader EU 
development and security goals such as the strengthening of human rights, the 
emergence of democratic politics and the development of the rule of law. EU 
security assistance has the effect of providing material and symbolic resources 
to the region’s authoritarian regimes without addressing the fundamental 
political issues which create corruption and confrontation at Central Asia’s 
borders.107 
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4.2.3 The promotion of international cooperation and initiatives  
 
  Besides the BOMCA/CADAP programmes, the EU’s involvement in  counter-
narcotics transiting through the ‘Northern route’ has, as such, been poor in 
comparison with  the  Russian  engagement.  This can be related to the current 
incapacity and/or lack of willingness of the EU to reinforce its role in this region, which 
is distant and ‘unfriendly’ to EU values. 
  Instead, the EU member states have decided to engage in counter-narcotics 
actions within other frameworks, like NATO, more suitable to their political objectives. 
Indeed, when Russia accepted to cooperate with Westerners on counter-narcotics 
in Central Asia through the NATO-Russia Council, one should not forget that 21 
member states out of the 27 in the EU are NATO members. This, in turn, reminds us 
that the EU’s Central Asian policy remains a difficult process, highly dependent on 
the willingness of the member states to promote EU action when other possibilities 
sometimes seem more suitable to the ‘hard’ Central Asian security context. In the 
Russian perception, NATO appears much more as a genuine security player than the 
EU.  
  Nevertheless, some noticeable initiatives have been undertaken to promote a 
common understanding of drug trafficking issues and to engage with other external 
actors and organisations. As for NATO, the EU member states have appeared 
divided and reluctant to develop cooperation with the two main security 
organisations in the region that  address,  though  imperfectly,  the  drugs problem. 
Indeed, the EU interactions with the CSTO and the SCO have so far been based on 
ad hoc contacts, as stated in the EU’s Strategy for Central Asia.108 
  For this purpose, ministerial meetings have been organised on an annual basis 
to discuss security issues with all five Central Asian republics. International and 
regional organisations were also invited to these meetings. During the first ‘EU-Central 
Asia Forum on Security Issues’109 held in Paris, the SCO and CSTO were among the 
invitees. Following  this first timid step, the EU was invited back to “the special 
Conference on Afghanistan convened under the auspices of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization”,110 which was organised by the Russian presidency of the 
SCO in 2009. 
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  It can, therefore, be noted  that  the EU’s engagement in  counter-narcotics 
and border management is further hindered by the lack of agreement among its 
member states on the approach to adopt towards other regional actors  or 
organisations concerned, such as the CSTO and the SCO, or even towards Russia. 
 
5.   Conclusions 
 
This paper has examined the extent to which the development of 
cooperation between Russia and the EU to respond to the common threat of 
increasing drug trafficking in Central Asia is desirable and feasible. It argued that 
Russian and European security interests are clearly overlapping and can potentially 
lead both to competition and to cooperation in the region. In many regards, the 
feasibility of developing Russia-EU cooperation for counter-narcotics in Central Asia is 
challenging,  although  highly  desirable  in order  to break with the current and 
detrimental competing mind-set among actors involved in the region. In recent 
years, their discourses have progressively converged and demonstrated awareness 
that drug flows coming from Afghanistan through the ‘Northern route’ constitute a 
multi-dimensional phenomenon  that has to be tackled  through regional and 
international cooperation.  
Although  the energy issues have led to strong competition, some nuances 
can, nevertheless, be highlighted. Despite a general mistrust among actors, the war 
in Afghanistan and the common perception of a high risk of contamination in the 
neighbourhood have led to important initiatives, such as the ‘Northern Distribution 
Network’. The drugs problem also appears to be among the top priorities of the 
political agenda of both actors. Therefore, it can be expected that, faced with 
increasing transnational drug flows and porous borders, both the EU and Russia, as 
well as the Central Asian states, will increasingly be open to a ‘cost sharing’ or, at 
best, to the progressive development of cooperation mechanisms on the ground.  
However, the nature of their presence in Central Asia and their perceptions of 
threat differ. For historical and political reasons, their interactions are still asymmetri-
cal in many respects, thus having important repercussions on the way each actor 
conceptualises its own involvement and perceives the involvement of the others. The 
EU possesses a lower and more accommodative geopolitical profile in Central Asia 
than other major actors. The analysis of mutual EU-Russia perceptions in the region 
shows that the EU is not, at the moment, considering Russia as a suitable partner for 
cooperation. From a Russian perspective, the EU in itself still does not represent a 
credible and coherent foreign policy actor for cooperation on ‘hard’ security issues 
in the Central Asian security context.   
The second point showed that the war in Afghanistan and the subsequent 
strengthening of its opium-based economy has further deepened tormenting trends Nathan Dufour 
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that already existed in the neighbouring countries of Central Asia in the 1990s. It was 
expected that the inclination of these countries to  repressive policies would offer 
possibilities for cooperation on ‘hard’ security issues, including on counter narcotics, 
as it would reinforce their domestic control. Nevertheless, the  in-depth analysis 
showed that the neo-patrimonial functioning of the Central Asian states rather 
constitutes an obstacle to efficient counter-narcotic policies. The crucial importance 
of the distrust factor, coupled with a clear lack of transparency and reliability of data 
plays a key role in this failure. As a result, several tendencies are being reinforced 
such as a more and more propitious environment for  transnational  smuggling,  a 
growing number of drug addicts and an increased general level of corruption. Last 
but not least, this functioning hampers, rather than facilitates,  regional and 
international initiatives to develop efficient anti-drug policies. 
Hence, the EU and Russia, among others, now have to adapt their security 
concerns to a more complex and unpredictable reality than in the 1990s. Indeed, 
the Central Asian states have progressively  proven their ability to use their key 
positions  –  as Afghan neighbours and through  their natural resources –  to adopt 
short-term interest-based strategies with all the risks related to them. Although the 
definition of a common vision of security and stability in the region is still largely 
influenced by Russia, both the EU and Russia have to deal with five different, and 
often unclear, foreign policies when seeking to promote cooperation mechanisms. 
Thus, no EU-Russia cooperation on security aspects in Central Asia is feasible without 
preliminary and close consultations with the Central Asian authorities. 
Finally, several observations can be pointed out when comparing the Russian 
and  EU  counter-narcotics instruments and actions.  In accordance with the UN 
recommendations, the anti-drug strategies and implementation plans of both actors 
emphasise  three milestones in order to  establish  efficient anti-drug strategies and 
policies: reduction of drug supply, reduction of drug demand and promotion of 
international cooperation. This constitutes, at least in the  official  discourses, an 
interesting basis for developing common discourses and cooperation mechanisms. 
The recent Russian initiatives at the domestic, regional and international level 
demonstrate a certain readiness to pragmatically cooperate with ‘everyone’ in 
Central Asia as well as a strong commitment to tackle the impact of drug flows on 
the Russian  territory  itself.  Indeed, interactions between Russia and other partners 
(the US, China, the EU and the Central Asian states) are  growing.  Despite  the 
apparent willingness of Russia to depoliticise the issue and its proactive role in setting 
up international cooperation  schemes,  the  current actions undertaken  and the 
Russian efforts to erect ‘security belts’ around Afghanistan are counter-productive. 
Moreover, some apprehensions were formulated about a clear overemphasis put on 
drugs control and repressive measures. EU Diplomacy Papers  9/2011 
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Notwithstanding  a  seemingly  more balanced and comprehensive EU 
approach  towards the reduction of drugs demand and development issues,  the 
outcomes have been insufficient. As in the cases of Russia and the Central Asian 
states, the EU has so far focused its attention on the securitisation of borders and the 
reduction of drug supply; efforts  which  are  deemed  to be fruitless  if  used alone. 
However, growing attention has been devoted to Central Asia as one of the main 
drug routes reaching the old continent,  and significant efforts are provided to 
strengthen the coordination between internal and external security policies and 
actors within the EU. 
Finally,  it was noted that the EU still underestimates  the potential of  a 
reinforced  coordination with other regional initiatives seeking  (even  though 
imperfectly) to cooperate on security and drug trafficking. As a consequence, the 
EU  clearly  lacks leverage in  the region and is not perceived as a genuine and 
reliable partner on what is still  considered as a  ‘hard’  security issue  by regional 
actors.  
Considering the current trends and the magnitude of the problem, the fight 
against drug trafficking coming from Afghanistan cannot be won in the  short or 
medium  run.  Even though  international cooperation is on the rise, important 
complementary actions can still be undertaken to reduce the negative impacts of 
drugs in Central Asia in the long run. In this respect, enhanced cooperation between 
the EU and Russia, both increasingly hit by drug flows transiting by the ‘Northern 
route’, could promote a positive-sum game in close coordination with the Central 
Asian states. Consequently, the following policy recommendations are formulated 
for strengthened cooperation at the international, regional and bilateral levels: 
 
1.  Promoting a de-politicisation of drug trafficking issues in international fora 
The current competing mind-set about how to deal with drug trafficking 
coming from Afghanistan is of high cost for both Russia and the EU. Prior to 
every international forum meeting related to international drug trafficking, the 
EU should reinforce the current consultation mechanisms with Russia 
(Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice) and reiterate the added-
value of a depoliticised approach to drugs in the long-term.  
2.  Depoliticising drug trafficking through pragmatic cooperation 
By fully supporting the newly established Central Asian Regional Information 
and Coordination  Centre (CARICC), in which the Central Asian states and 
Russia participate, the EU would  show its readiness to work for  genuine 
regional solutions, and it would gain in credibility. Nathan Dufour 
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3.  Emphasising the importance of reducing drug demand and prevention 
The EU and its member states have acquired a solid experience in the quest 
for reducing the demand of drugs and in the field of prevention. This know-
how should clearly be emphasised during EU-Russia meetings, at all levels, as it 
could contribute to balance the Russian anti-drug strategy and promote long-
term perspectives. 
4.   Enhancing cooperation with regional initiatives 
So far, the Russian Federation has shown reluctance to effectively cooperate 
with the EU on cross-border issues as this cooperation would essentially address 
flows (organised crime, drug trafficking, illegal immigration) coming from 
Russia  and not the other way around. By showing willingness to cooperate 
upstream in Central Asia, particularly through closer links with the SCO and 
CSTO, the EU  could enhance its visibility and reliability towards the Central 
Asian states and Russia, and it could actively work to build trust. 
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